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Many networks are used to transfer information or goods, in other words, they are navigated.
The larger the network, the more difficult it is to navigate efficiently. Indeed, information routing
in the Internet faces serious scalability problems due to its rapid growth, recently accelerated by
the rise of the Internet of Things. Large networks like the Internet can be navigated efficiently
if nodes, or agents, actively forward information based on hidden maps underlying these systems.
However, in reality most agents will deny to forward messages, which has a cost, and navigation is
impossible. Can we design appropriate incentives that lead to participation and global navigability?
Here, we present an evolutionary game where agents share the value generated by successful delivery
of information or goods. We show that global navigability can emerge, but its complete breakdown
is possible as well. Furthermore, we show that the system tends to self-organize into local clusters
of agents who participate in the navigation. This organizational principle can be exploited to favor
the emergence of global navigability in the system.
Keywords: Complex networks, navigation, incentives, participatory greedy routing
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of the Internet of Things is expected
to lead to more than 50 billion connected devices by
2020 [1], which implies challenges for the scalability of the
digital infrastructure [2–5]. Decentralized systems [6–8]
provide the required scalability in addition to the ad-
vantage of high transparency and a low risk of abuse
by single, powerful entities [9, 10]. These architectures,
however, face particular problems concerning their func-
tionality. A key challenge is how to route information
relying only on local knowledge [11–17]. To accomplish
this task, the alignment of incentives of the involved in-
dividuals or institutions in the routing process to achieve
global navigability is of crucial importance [2].
Routing information is among the most important
functions real complex networks must perform. Exam-
ples include biological networks like the human brain,
social networks [18], and the Internet [12, 19]. Many real
complex networks have shown to be navigable, where
nodes efficiently route messages using the connectiv-
ity of the network without relying on knowledge about
the global topology. This can be achieved by per-
forming greedy routing [20, 21] in underlying geometric
spaces [11–16]. Greedy routing builds on nodes forward-
ing incoming messages to their neighbor that has the
smallest distance to the destination measured in the un-
derlying geometric space.
In reality, there is a cost associated to sending mes-
sages, which can be a physical cost or invested time or
energy. This cost implies that individuals are unlikely
to be willing to participate without incentives. Further-
more, if even a single node in a given message forwarding
chain decides not to participate (defect), the entire de-
livery fails. This vulnerability of the navigation process
∗ kkleineberg@ethz.ch
raises serious concerns about the feasibility of navigation
in realistic environments. Here, we introduce an incen-
tive to participate in the navigation process and show
that it can promote the emergence of global navigability.
In reality, networks have a utility, and hence the suc-
cessful delivery of information or goods generates value.
We assume that this value is distributed equally among
the individuals that took part in the forwarding process,
which could be realized in digital environments by an
appropriately designed cryptocurrency [22]. In the fol-
lowing we study an evolutionary game [23–28] that we
call participatory greedy routing. We show that in the
real IPv6 Internet topology as well as in synthetic net-
works, the mentioned incentive allows for the emergence
of global cooperation and navigability in the system de-
spite its vulnerability to defection. On the other hand,
complete defection and the total breakdown of naviga-
bility is also possible. We shed light onto the conditions
under which the system approaches the navigable state.
In addition, we reveal that global cooperation emerges
as the system self-organizes into local clusters of cooper-
ators, which tend to spread and merge. Finally, building
on this knowledge, we show how the initial minimal den-
sity of cooperators needed to drive the system to the
navigable state can be reduced significantly by adopting
an “act local” strategy.
II. RESULTS
A. Navigation of complex networks via hidden
metric spaces
It has been shown that real complex networks can be
embedded into hidden hyperbolic metric spaces [13, 14].
In these mappings, each node i is mapped into the hy-
perbolic plane where it is represented by the polar co-
ordinates ri, θi. These coordinates, or hidden variables,
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Figure 1. (a) Illustration of a message forwarding path found by greedy routing. Nodes and edges on the path are highlighted.
(b) Illustration of the different possible scenarios of message forwarding events. In the first two cases, the message is delivered
successfully. Each node obtains a share of the generated value b and those that forwarded the message pay the cost of 1. Here,
we have four nodes involved (including the final recipient), and hence each node obtains the share b/4. The state of the final
destination has no impact, as a defector will also happily receive her message. In the third and fourth case the delivery fails.
In the third case the message is given to a defector along the chain which simply does not forward the message. In the fourth
case, although all nodes cooperate, the message runs into a loop and the delivery also fails, which is a property of the classical
greedy routing procedure. In the third and fourth case, there is no reward, and each node that has sent the message to a
neighbor pays the cost of 1 (i.e. a payoff of −1).
abstract the popularity and similarity of nodes [16]. The
radial coordinate ri is related to the expected degree
of node i and therefore abstracts its popularity. More
popular nodes are placed towards the center of the disc
and hence obtain a lower radial coordinate. The an-
gular distance between nodes i and j given by ∆θij =
pi − |pi − |θi − θj || is a measure of the similarity of i and
j. A lower distance means a higher similarity. In simple
terms, in a social network nodes close to you in this space
would be your peers rather than your geographic neigh-
bors. In the following, we always refer to this measure of
proximity. The hyperbolic distance [11],
xij = cosh
−1 (cosh ri cosh rj − sinh ri sinh rj cos ∆θij)
≈ ri + rj + 2 ln (∆θij/2) ,
(1)
comprises information about both the similarity and pop-
ularity of nodes i and j. The connection probability for
a given pair of nodes depends only on their hyperbolic
distance. Given a real network, the coordinates of nodes
can be inferred, using Maximum Likelihood Estimation
techniques [12–14].
In the inferred hyperbolic maps, one can identify soft
communities, which are clusters of nodes close to each
other in the angular similarity space [12, 16, 29, 30],
predict missing links [13, 14, 29], and perform effi-
cient greedy routing reaching targets with high suc-
cess rates and following approximatively topologically
shortest paths [12–14, 19]. Importantly, the synthetic
networks generated in this work are small-world net-
works [31].
In greedy routing, each node forwards messages to
her neighbor that is closest to the target in the un-
derlying metric space. This means that node i for-
wards the message to its neighbor node j located at the
smallest hyperbolic distance to the target node t, i.e.
xjt = minl∈NB(i) xlt, where l runs over all neighbors of i
and x is the hyperbolic distance from Eq. 1. This pro-
cess is illustrated in Fig. 1a. Only local knowledge about
the coordinates of neighbors and those of the target is
needed to perform routing. If a message is given back to
a node it has already visited, the delivery fails (see [20]
for details).
However, greedy routing assumes that all nodes, or
agents, participate in the process, which is not the case
in reality. In the following, we consider a cost associated
with sending messages and present incentives that can
lead to global-scale cooperation and a high performance
of the system.
B. Participatory greedy routing
Participating in the forwarding of messages implies a
commitment of the involved agents in terms of time and
resources, in other words, sending messages has a cost.
Individual agents will only be willing to pay this cost if
they obtain a benefit from using the network. Hence,
it is essential to create an incentive that can enable the
emergence of global cooperation among the agents in the
system. Real networks perform certain functions, and
hence successfully delivering information or goods gener-
ates value. In decentralized systems, this value is gener-
ated in a bottom-up way by the agents who perform the
routing. Consequently, we assume that the value gener-
ated, which we call b, is distributed equally among the
3agents that participate in the successful delivery. In ad-
dition, each agent that sends a message has to pay a cost,
which we set to 1. This cost is paid even if the message is
not delivered. Note that a single defector along the chain
(except for the final destination) will lead to a failure of
delivery (see Fig. 1b). Each forwarding chain is similar
to a coordination game in the sense that the reward is
only obtained if all nodes in the chain cooperate. How-
ever, costs are only paid until the message reaches the
first defector.
Is cooperation possible despite the strong impact that
even a single defector can have? And if yes, under which
conditions? To answer these questions, we design an evo-
lutionary game called participatory greedy routing, in
which individual agents choose their strategy such that
they either cooperate or defect. Cooperators forward
messages, whereas defectors ignore them and hence even
a single one causes the entire delivery to fail.
Participatory greedy routing is defined as follows and
consists of three phases: i) Initialization phase: First, we
either generate synthetic networks of size N with an un-
derlying hyperbolic geometry using the model described
in Appendix A, or we use the real IPv6 Internet topology
and its mapping to hyperbolic space (see Appendix B).
Then, we randomly distribute the initial cooperators,
whose density we denote by C0, in the network. We
will discuss the impact of a different distribution of ini-
tial cooperators later. For now, let us move on to the
ii) navigation phase: We randomly select pairs of nodes
that act as source and target of a message sending pro-
cess. We simulate the greedy routing process [20, 21]
by forwarding the message to the neighbor closest to the
target in the metric space at each step until it either
reaches its destination or enters a loop or is passed on to
a defector. In the last two cases, the delivery fails. Af-
ter each message sending intent, we distribute the pay-
offs: each agents that has sent the message to another
agent pays the cost of 1 (i.e. her payoff is reduced by 1),
and only if the message was delivered successfully, each
agent that participated in the forwarding chain (includ-
ing the final destination) obtains her share b/lc of the
generated value, where lc denotes the length of the chain
including the final recipient. iii) Update phase: After N
message sending intents, we perform a step where indi-
viduals can update their strategies following a replicator
dynamics [32–34]. Each agent i selects a random neigh-
bor j and copies her strategy (cooperate or defect) with a
probability that depends on the payoff difference pj − pi,
pi←j =
1
1 + e−(pj−pi)/K
, (2)
where K mimics the randomness of decisions (here we
always set K = 1). After all agents update their strategy,
we reset all payoffs and go back to the navigation phase
until we reach the end of the simulation.
C. Bistability of the system
We find that the system can approach two qualitatively
different states in the long term. A functional state, in
which nearly the entire population cooperates and the
system is highly navigable, and a non-functional state, in
which nearly the whole population defects and the system
cannot be navigated at all (see Fig. 2a). This bistability
can be understood intuitively from the feedback between
system performance and cooperation. If cooperation de-
creases, the system as a whole performs worse, and the
temptation to defect increases, as obtaining the reward
for successfully delivering a message becomes less likely.
Hence, defection increases, which further decreases the
system performance, which further increases defection,
and so on, leading eventually to a complete breakdown
of cooperation [35] and navigability. On the other hand,
more cooperation means a better system performance,
making cooperation a better strategy choice, which can
lead to nearly full cooperation and navigability.
The final fate of the system is determined by the initial
rate of cooperators C0 and the payoff parameter b. We
find that in a large region of the phasespace either the
functional state (blue region in Fig. 2a,b,d,e) or the non-
functional state (red region) is approached with a high
probability. These regions are separated by a smaller
region in which both states are approached with inter-
mediate probabilities (white region).
Finally, note that, for full cooperation, participatory
greedy routing degenerates towards greedy routing. In
this optimal case, we find for the synthetic networks (γ =
2.5) a success rate of (87.2 ± 3.1)% for greedy routing
with an average of (4.1 ± 0.3) hops. For the Internet
IPv6 network, we find that (91.6 ± 0.5) percent of the
messages are delivered successfully with (3.61±0.03) hops
on average. In the functional state, participatory greedy
routing yields a performance close to these optimal values
(see Supplementary Materials).
D. Self-organized local clusters drive global
cooperation
We observe that the spontaneous emergence of coop-
erating local clusters precedes the global emergence of
cooperation [36], and the underlying metric space of-
fers a natural representation of such clusters. In Fig. 3
we present an explicit realization of the system for syn-
thetic networks (see Supplementary Video 1) and one for
the IPv6 Internet network (see Supplementary Video 2),
where we start with a small fraction of cooperators that
are chosen at random. Initially, the fraction of coopera-
tors decreases (see Fig. 3a), but at the same time local-
ized clusters of high cooperation emerge. Such clusters
are sets of nodes in a small angular interval of the under-
lying space (see Fig. 3b and c). Importantly, these clus-
ters are successful because message paths follow shortest
distances, and hence nodes within such a cluster can com-
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Figure 2. (a) Probability of reaching the successful state (blue color) as a function of the initial cooperation rate C0 and
the payoff b. Here, we generated networks using the model described in Appendix A with 10000 nodes, a power law degree
distribution with exponent γ = 2.5, temperature T = 0.4, and mean degree 〈k〉 ≈ 6. The results are averaged over 50
simulations. A realization is said to have approached the functional state if the performance of the system in the stationary
state is larger than 0.5. To compute the quantities in the stationary state, we first let 250 rounds pass, which avoids the initial
transient phase, and then we average over another 250 rounds. Note that we only observe states that either perform very well
with success rates 0.5 or very poorly with success rates 0.5 (see Supplementary Materials). Initial conditions are randomly
assigned cooperators. (b) Same as before but starting from clustered cooperators according to Eq. (3). (c) Threshold value of
C0 for the system to approach the functional state with at least 50% probability (black lines in a, b) for different values of the
power-law exponent γ. Solid lines correspond to the random distribution of initial cooperators, whereas dashed lines represent
the clustered initial configuration. Arrows show the reduction of the initial “critical mass”. (d-e) Same as a-c but for the IPv6
Internet network (averaged over 200 realizations).
municate despite the initially very low cooperation and
poor performance of the system globally. If enough value
b is generated, these clusters can create a higher payoff
than their defecting neighbors. This implies that defec-
tors located at the border of a cooperating cluster have
a high probability of switching to cooperation, which re-
sults in their assimilation of the cluster. Hence, the lo-
calized clusters of high cooperation grow and eventually
merge until they cover a large fraction of the network.
To sum up, in simple terms, global cooperation emerges
from the spread of local clusters of cooperators.
E. Heterogeneity and clustering of cooperators
reduces the initial “critical mass”
We have seen that an initial “critical mass”, i.e. a
certain minimal density of initial cooperators is needed
to drive the system to the functional state. We find that
less initial cooperators are needed if the networks are
more heterogeneous (see Fig. 2c). The navigability of
the system—even for full cooperation—decreases quickly
for γ > 2.9, which implies that it becomes very difficult
to drive the system to the state of high cooperation (see
Supplementary Materials). Note that most real complex
networks have power-law exponents between 2 and 3 and
are navigable [12].
As discussed in the previous section, the system dy-
namically self-organizes into localized clusters of high
cooperation, which then expand and merge, eventually
giving rise to global cooperation [36]. We can exploit the
understanding of this process to lower the minimal ini-
tial density of cooperators. In particular, instead of dis-
tributing them randomly, we can assign them to a certain
region of the angular space (see Supplementary Fig. 1f)
by assigning to node i the strategy
Si(0) =
{
1 if θi ∈ [0, 2piC0),
0 else,
(3)
where θi denotes the angular coordinate of node i. This
leads on average to an initial density C0 of cooperators
5Figure 3. (a) Emergence of cooperation in a synthetic network for b = 25 and C0 = 0.15 with N = 3000 nodes and a power
law degree distribution with exponent γ = 2.5, temperature T = 0.4, and mean degree 〈k〉 ≈ 6. We show the evolution of the
density of cooperators (blue line) and the success rate of navigation (yellow line). Time t represents the number of update
phases the system has undergone. (b) Histograms for the same realization for the number of cooperators (blue) and total
number of nodes (yellow) in respective bins of the angular coordinate θ. Time increases from left to right, t = (7, 17, 75). (c)
Network and states of the nodes for times t = (7, 17, 75) for the same realization, see Supplementary Video 1. (e-f) Same as
a-c, but for the IPv6 Internet network and for C0 = 0.15 and b = 30. Times shown are t = (5, 10, 30), see Supplementary Video
2.
6due to the uniform distribution of angular coordinates in
the model for the generation of synthetic networks (see
Appendix A). This strategy significantly reduces the min-
imal initial density of cooperators required to reach the
desired functional state. We define a threshold of ini-
tial cooperators above which the functional state is ap-
proached with more than 50% probability. We find that
starting with clustered initial cooperators can reduce this
threshold by up to 50% for the synthetic networks con-
sidered (γ = 2.7), and by up to 24% for the IPv6 Internet
topology (see Fig. 2c and f). To conclude, starting with
local clusters of cooperators strongly favors the emer-
gence of global cooperation and navigability.
III. COMMUNITY STRUCTURE OF THE REAL
INTERNET NETWORK
As mentioned above, the real Internet IPv6 topology
leads to similar results as for the case of synthetic net-
works. Especially, we again find a bistable behavior
(see Fig. 2d and e), meaning that the system can be
either in a state of high cooperation and navigability or
nearly total defection and complete breakdown of nav-
igability. We also find that clustering of the initial co-
operators [37] decreases the minimal density required to
drive the system to the desired state (see Fig. 2f). In
accordance with our findings concerning synthetic net-
works, the higher heterogeneity present in the Internet
IPv6 topology (γ ≈ 2.1) favors the emergence of global
cooperation and reduces the relative effect of clustered
initial cooperators compared to distributing them ran-
domly (compare Fig. 2c and f).
The existence of angular bins with significantly higher
than average number of nodes is an indicator of a commu-
nity structure that is present in real networks, in contrast
to the synthetic networks considered here. In the real In-
ternet IPv6 topology, the emerging clusters of high coop-
eration coincide—to some extend—with the community
structure of the network (see Fig. 3e, f, and Supplemen-
tary Video 2).
IV. DISCUSSION
Real complex networks have shown to be navigable effi-
ciently and relying only on local knowledge by performing
greedy routing in underlying hidden metric spaces. How-
ever, greedy routing assumes that all nodes, or agents,
participate in the process, which is often not the case
in reality. Forwarding information has a cost for the
agents, which can be a physical cost or invested time
or energy. This cost is especially important because it
causes a temptation for individual agents to defect (not
participate in the navigation). The navigation process
is vulnerable to defection because even a single defector
leads to the failure of an entire forwarding chain. How-
ever, successfully delivering information in real networks
generates value, which in decentralized systems is gener-
ated in a bottom-up way.
We assume that this value is shared among the agents
that participate in the successful delivery. Agents can
cooperate or defect, i.e. participate or not. We call this
process participatory greedy routing. We show in the
real IPv6 Internet network as well as in synthetic net-
works that, in participatory greedy routing, global co-
operation can emerge from local interactions. We show
that the system is effectively bistable, and can either be
functional, in which case nearly the entire population co-
operates and the network is highly navigable, or non-
functional, which corresponds to the complete breakdown
of navigability and nearly total defection. Interestingly,
the emergence of global cooperation is preceded by the
self-organization of the system into clusters of high coop-
eration. This organizational principle can be exploited to
lower the critical initial density of cooperators needed to
drive the system—with a high probability—to the desired
functional state. We show that, if the initial cooperators
are concentrated in a local cluster, the required minimal
number of initial cooperators is reduced significantly.
The inclusion of a reputation system [38], competition
between several networks [19, 39–41], and adapting the
network topology [17] constitute interesting tasks for fu-
ture work. Participatory navigation procedures like the
one described in this manuscript are likely to play an im-
portant role in decentralized future digital environments
and could sustain information routing in the Internet.
Our results confirm that the emergence of global cooper-
ation and navigability is possible with the correct incen-
tives and that the adoption of participatory bottom-up
navigation is favored by starting with local clusters of
participating agents. This is particularly important for
the implementation in real systems.
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Appendix A: Synthetic networks
We construct synthetic networks using the S1 model
described in [15], which we then map to its approxima-
tively equivalent counterpart in the hyperbolic plane, the
H2 [11] model.
1. S1 model
In the S1 model each node i has a set of hidden vari-
ables κi, θi. κi denotes the expected degree of node i, and
the angular coordinate θi ∈ [0, 2pi) abstracts a similarity
7space. The model parameters are size N , the exponent
for the power law degree distribution, γ > 2, average
degree k¯, and temperature T ∈ [0, 1]. The network gen-
eration procedure then works as follows:
1. Assign hidden variables: For each of the N nodes,
we draw θi from the uniform distribution in [0, 2pi)
and κi from the probability density function
ρ(κ) = (γ − 1)κminγ−1κ−γ , (A1)
κmin = k¯
γ − 2
γ − 1 ,
where κmin controls the expected mean degree k¯.
2. Now, we connect each pair of nodes i, j with the
probability
r(κi, θi;κj , θj) =
1
1 +
[
d(θi,θj)
µκiκj
] 1
T
, (A2)
d(θi, θj) =
N
2pi
∆θij , ∆θij = |pi − |pi − |θi − θj |||,
µ =
sinTpi
2k¯Tpi
,
where d(θi, θj) denotes the the angular distance be-
tween i and j.
2. Transformation to H2
We transform the S1 model to the H2 model in the
hyperbolic plane by mapping the hidden variables κi to
radial coordinates ri according to
ri = R− 2 ln κi
κmin
, (A3)
where R denotes the disc radius given by
R = 2 ln
N
c
, (A4)
c = k¯
sinTpi
2T
(
γ − 2
γ − 1
)2
.
Finally, note that in the H2 model the connection prob-
ability from Eq. (A2) translates to the Fermi-Dirac dis-
tribution
p(xij) =
1
1 + e
1
2T (xij−R)
, (A5)
and depends only on the hyperbolic distance
xij = cosh
−1 (cosh ri cosh rj − sinh ri sinh rj cos ∆θij)
(A6)
between the nodes [11].
Appendix B: The IPv6 Internet topology
In the IPv6 Internet topology each node represens an
Autonomous System. The data was collected and de-
veloped by the Archipelago active measurement infras-
tructure (ARK) and CAIDA [42]. Autonomous Systems
are constituents of the Internet infrastructure that are
managed by a single entity and exchange traffic between
them. Connections in the topology represent relation-
ships between different Autonomous Systems to facilitate
the exchange of traffic. The dataset [43] consists of Au-
tonomous Systems that route information using the IPv6
protocol. The topology used in [19] was obtained by join-
ing the connections during the first 15 days of January
2015 taken from [43]. The network has N = 5163 nodes,
a power law degree distribution with exponent γ = 2.1,
and average degree of 〈k〉 = 5.21, and an average mean
local clustering coefficient of c = 0.55. The processed net-
work data and its hyperbolic mapping were taken from
publication [19]. The hyperbolic mapping was obtained
using the HyperMap method [13, 14]. An implementation
of this method is publicly available at [44].
Appendix C: Localized initial conditions in the IPv6
topology
To assign localized initial conditions in the real Inter-
net, due to the non-uniform distribution of angular coor-
dinates, we cannot proceed like in the case of synthetic
networks described by Eq. (3). This procedure would
lead to significantly different numbers of initial coopera-
tors depending on which section of the angular space one
selects. Instead, we perform as follows. First, we order
all nodes according to their angular coordinate. Then, we
randomly select a node, i, and simply assign the nodes
in the interval [i, i+NC0] to cooperators. The ordering
then ensures that they all lie within an angular sector.
We choose node i randomly so that the set of initial co-
operators differs between different realizations.
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